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LINTRODUCTION

One can only understand the extent and effect of constitutional
borrowing in a particular state if the historical and socio-legal context
of that country is understood.'
The early 1990's saw the unprecedented negotiation of a new dispensation in South Africa, resulting in profound changes to the
country's social, political and economic structures. Many of these
changes are codified in the interim Constitution (the "IC"), including an entrenched justiciable Bill of Ri hts,3 which became the supreme law of the land on April 27, 1994. The inclusion ofjusticiable
rights was a unique event since the constitutions adopted in 1910,
1961 and 1983 all provided for parliamentary supremacy.5 Another
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Western Cape, South Africa. Visiting Professor of
Law in 1998 at the Universities of Maryland, Cincinnati and Oregon. B.A., L.L.B., University of
Natal in South Africa, L.L.M., Harvard Law School, Doctorate of Laws, University of the Westem Cape.
For some background discussion of the legal and social structures of South Africa, see
LAWRENCE BOULLE, ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: BASIC PRINCIPLES 101-

113 (1989); Jeremy Sarkin & Howard Varney, Traditional Weapons, CulturalExpediency and the
Political Conflict in South Africa: A Culture of Weapons and a Culture of Violence, 6 S. AFR. J. CRIM.
JUST. 2, 2-4 (1993);Jeremy Sarkin, Preventive Detention in South Africa, in PREvENTIVE DETENTION
AND SECURITY LAW: A COMPARATIVE SURVEY 210, 210-20 (Andrew Harding & John Hatchard

eds., 1993).
2 See generally Jeremy Sarkin, The Development of a Human Rights Culture in South Africa, 20
HUM. RTs. Q. 628 (1998) (discussing the development of the two constitutions and the restructuring of the government infrastructure including the court and criminal justice system).
See Etienne Mureinik, A Bridge to Where? Introducing the Interim Bill of Rights, 10 S. AFR. J.
HUM. RTS. 31, 33 (1994); see also S. AFR. CONST. of 1993 (IC), ch. 3 (delineating numerous
"Fundamental Rights").
4 See David Welsh, Negotiating a Democratic Constitution, in CHANGES IN SOUTH AFRICA 25 (J.E.
Spence ed., 1994).
5 See Dion A. Basson, The Legislative Authority: The Relationship Between Parliamentand the
Courts: ParliamentarySovereignty (Section E), in SOUTH AFRICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 169-200
(Christina Van der Walt trans., 1988).
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feature of the interim Constitution was the creation of a Constitutional Assembly tasked with drafting the final Constitution between
1994 and 1996. This Constitution was adopted at the end of 1996
and came into force on February 4, 1997. 7
In drafting the Constitution, South Africa followed the recent
trend discernible elsewhere of borrowing from international instruments, national constitutions and international and foreign decisions
in order to benefit from the lessons learned by others." This international trend toward comparative analysis and borrowing is particularly
prevalent where new democracies emerging from years of domination and repression seek to entrench democracy and provide protection from human rights abuses. Constitutional borrowing occurs because the drafters of new constitutions often seek the assistance of
lawyers from states with constitutions and a history of constitutional
adjudication, since domestic experience in such endeavors is usually
limited. These lawyers bring with them their own experiences of constitutional systems, which are then incorporated, to some degree, in
the constitution that they are helping to draft.9
International and foreign experience substantially affected the
process of constitutional drafting in South Africa and has already had
a major effect on the constitutional and human rights adjudication
that has taken place since 1994. '0 Lessons learned in the international arena are evident throughout both the interim and final Constitutions. Areas influenced included the structure of the state, the
structure of the court system, and, most prominently, the content and
language of the two bills of rights." In addition to the indirect effects
of international and comparative laws and decisions, both the interim
and final Constitutions have explicit provisions that impact the reception and role of international and comparative law in constitutional
adjudication. 2 This article examines the extent to which interna6 See S. AFR. CONST. of 1993 (IC), ch. 5, §§ 68-74.

See Proc. No. R. 6, 1997 (making February 4, 1997 the date of effectiveness pursuant to
Section 243 of the final Constitution).
8 See John Claydon &Jennie Hatfield, The Use of InternationalHuyran Rights Law to Intrpret
Canada'sCharierof Rights and Freedom 2 CONN.J. INr'L L. 349,354-59 (1987) (discussing the use
of international sources to interpret the meaning of the Canadian Bill of Rights, which like the
South African Bill of Rights, was influenced by external legal sources).
9 For example, two American constitutional lawyers played a direct role in drafting the
Inkatha Freedom Party's Bill of Rights. The influence of the United States legal s)3tem is also
found in many places in the KwaZulu Bill of Rights.
10 See, e.g., State v. Makwanyane and Another, 1995 (3) SALR 391.436-39 (CC) (considering
numerous sources of foreign law when deciding the constitutionality of the death penalty); se
infra Section IV (discussing a number of seminal cases decided under the interim Constitution).
1 See S. AR. CONST. of 1996, ch. 2 ("Bill of Rights"); S. APR. CO.T. of 1993 (IC). ch. 3
("Fundamental Rights").
1 The most significant of these provisions in the final Constitution are Sections 39 and 231
that mandate the use of foreign and international sources in certain circumstances and determine the legal status of international agreements. Se S. AFR. CO'ST. of 1996. cl. 2. § 39(1) (bc) (defining the use of the foreign and public international law); id. at ch. 14. § 231 (defining

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 1: 2

tional and foreign law impacted the drafting of the interim Constitution and how the expanded role of international and comparative law
has impacted the South African legal system." Only the interim Constitution is evaluated and not the final Constitution, as part of the
evaluation examines the role of the Constitutional Court in the development of the final Constitution. The effect of international experience is also examined to determine why a separate and distinct
Constitutional Court was introduced into the domestic court system. 4
The particular socio-political context in South Africa accounts to
some degree for South African acceptance, in theory at least, of international law and comparative experience. Therefore, this article
reviews a few selected Constitutional Court decisions where this body
of law could, and did, play a critical role to examine whether reliance
on these bodies of law substantially shaped the interpretation of the
South African interim Constitution and Bill of Rights. 6
While the Constitution enjoins the courts to consider international law and makes it permissible to apply foreign law, '" the courts
may depart from these laws. Thus, while there has been a great deal
of reliance on international and comparative law in South Africa,
with the courts extensively citing such laws and decisions, the courts
have also often departed from these positions or quoted from them
selectively in support of the decision being handed down. 8
II.THE INTERIM CONSTITUTION
The shift from parliamentary to constitutional supremacy is
probably the most critical shift to occur during the transition to democracy in South Africa. 9 Until the introduction of ajusticiable constitution in April 1994, Parliament was sovereign and there was no
check on state power.20 Thus, the legislature could adopt any law and

the mechanisms used to determine the legal status of international agreements). As will be discussed, see infra text accompanying notes 39 and 41, the interim Constitution included similar
provisions. See S. AFR. CONST. of 1993 (IC), ch. 3, § 35(a); id. atch. 14, § 231.
IS See infta section II.
14 See infra section III.
15 SeeJohan D. van der Vyver, Comparative Law in ConstitutionalLitigation,
111 S. AFR. LJ. 19
(1994) (using a judgement under the Declaration of Fundamental Rights in the Bophuthatswana Constitution Act of 1977 to argue for the value of understanding the intricacies of comparative law in constitutional litigation).
16 See infra section IV. This section considers State
v. Makwanyane and Another, 1995 (3) SALR
391 (CC), In re GautengEducationBill of 1995, 1996 (3) SALR 165 (CC), and Azanian Peoples Organization (AZAPO) and Others v. Presidentof the Republic of South Africa and Others, 1996 (4) SALR

671 (CC).

See infra note 61 and accompanying text.

is See infra text accompanying notes 177 and 189.

19 SeeS. AFR. CONST. of 1993 (IC), ch. 7, § 98(2) (granting the Constitutional Court jurisdiction over all matters concerning Constitutional interpretation).
20 See Basson, supra note 5, at 169-200 (explaining that South African constitutional
law developed out of English constitutional law and, therefore, judicial authority has traditionally
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the courts had only a procedural reviewing function.'
The legal system in apartheid South Africa was a mixture of statute and hybrid common law, largely comprised of Roman-Dutch law
and elements of English law.-" During the apartheid years, South Africa had little regard for international or comparative law. The country was seen by many, including the United Nations and other interSimilarly, the South African
national bodies, as a pariah.H
an enemy and accorded
Nations
United
the
considered
government
emanating from
documents
and
decisions
various
to
the
scant regard
that organization.24
In 1989, the South African Law Commission explained the irrelevance of international law and its inability to impact the South African situation:
It cannot be envisaged that human rights norms as enshrined in international law can to any extent play a part let alone a significant part - in the decision of the protection
of group and individual rights in South Africa. Safety does
not lie in the hope that our courts will apply the norms of
international lav.n

This view was grounded in the fact that for almost half a century
the apartheid state had defied the United Nations and dismissed its
Universal Declaration of Human Rights as communist propaganda."'
The regime also vilified the declarations and resolutions of various
27
United Nations agencies.
As a result of South Africa's isolation and resistance to international law, South African lawyers and judges generally lacked knowledge and experience about the meaning of these documents,' about
been subordinate to legislative authority); N. J. HOsTEN ET AL, lNrRODUCTION TO SOUTH
AFRICAN INW AND LEGAL THEORY 597-634 (1977) (discussing in great detail the South African
constitutional structure and its historical influences).
21 SeeBasson, supra note 5,at 190-91.
See, eg., WIIl'S PRINCIPLES OF SOUTH AFRICAN L-w 20-37 (Dale Hutchison et al. eds., 8th
ed. 1991) (explaining that Roman-Dutch law was used to create the South African legal s)4tem
which was later influenced in the early nineteenth century by English law).
THE STRUGGLE AakST
2 See AuDIE KLOTZ, NORS IN INTEmRATIOAL REL- Tios:
APARTHMID 48-54 (1995) (discussing how the United Nations used a wide range of diplomatic,
military and economic sanctions to punish the apartheid regime).
24 See CHRIS ALDEN, APARTHEID's LAST STAND: THE RISE AND FALL OF THE SOUTH Am-CN
SECURITY STATE 49 (1996) (pointing out that for white South Africans, die United Nation's passage of a mandatory arms embargo against South Africa represented a "multi-dimensional onslaught" against the country).
South African Law Commission, Wlordng Paper25 Profjt 58 Groupand HurranRights at 182
(1989).
2 For an extensive discussion of the tense relationship betveen the United Nations and
South Africa, see LOUIS B. SOHN, RIGHTS IN CONFLICT: THE UNrrED NATIO\S AND SOUTH
AFRICA 63-170 (1994); KLOTZ, supranote 23, at 3-12, 39-55.
However, it is noteworthy that South Africa remained a member of the United Nations,
which itjoined on November 7, 1945. See UNITED NATIONS, MEMBER ST,%TES (visiced December
7, 1998) <http://www.un.org/Overiew/unmember.hUnt>.
Lawyers from the exiled liberation movements, however, had studied abroad and had
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how they came to be adopted, and about how they could shape and
influence the content of South African law once a constitutional system became the order of the day.2 This created an opportunity for
lawyers from other countries to participate in different ways in the
drafting of both the interim and final Constitutions."
Various draft versions of bills of rights were published between
1990 and 1994.3' Although most emanated from political parties, one
was drafted by the South African Law Commission and another, A
Charter for Social Justice, was authored by a group of independent
progressive lawyers from the Western Cape. All these proposals borrowed from the international experience. This is especially true of
the Charter for Social Justice, whose drafters were mainly academic
lawyers, mostly with foreign study backgrounds, who extensively studied other constitutions and bills of rights.'"
The impact of these various draft bills of rights has been noted by
the drafters of the interim Bill of Rights, particularly in relation to its
structure and grammar." They noted that, in regard to specific wording, the technical committee relied on proposals framed in "suitably
broad language" and thus looked to the Charter for Social Justice,
the Democratic Party's draft bill of rights and various sections of the
been schooled in international and foreign law. These lawyers attended law schools in different
parts of the world including the United Kingdom, the United States, Germany, Canada, Poland,
Mozambique, Zambia, Lesotho and Russia. South African academic lawyers had also studied
abroad. The tradition, however, was for those graduating from the Afrikaans law schools to
study mainly in Europe, specifically in Germany, Belgium and the Netherlands. Those graduating from English law schools generally pursued graduate studies in the United Kingdom although
some went to the United States.
20
In South Africa there was a debate in the mid-1980's on the need for a bill
of rights. Outside the country, conferences and other forums were held to debate what a future South African Constitution and Bill of Rights ought to contain. One such conference was held at Columbia University entitled, "Human Rights in the Post-Apartheid South African Constitution."
See 21 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. (1989) (reprinting select papers from the conference).
30 SeeJeremy Sarkin, The Role of the Legal Profession in the Promotion
and Advancement of a Human Rights Culture,COMM. L. BULL. 1306 (1995) (describing the influential role of international
lawyers in the drafting process due to their much greater familiarity with a constitutional structure).
31 For example, the African National Congress, the South
African Law Commission, the
South African Government, the Democratic Party, the Inkatha Freedom Party, the Association
of Law Societies of the Republic of South Africa, and the Equality Foundation all provided
drafts.
See LOURENS DU PLESSIS & HUGH CORDER, UNDERSTANDING SOUTH AFRICA'S
TRANSITIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS 48-51, 192-94 (1994) (providing an in-depth discussion of the
constitutional drafting process and an overview of each group's main goals).
32 See HUGH CORDER ET AL., A CHARTER FOR SOCIALJUSTICE (1992).
The draft was written by
Hugh Corder, Steve Kahanovitz, John Murphy, Christina Murray, Katherine O'Regan, Jeremy
Sarkin, Henk Smith and Nico Steytier. Hugh Corder subsequently became a member of the
technical committee responsible for drafting the interim Constitution's Bill of Rights, Katherine
O'Regan became a Constitutional Court judge, and Christina Murray became a member of the
panel of experts responsible for drafting the final Constitution.
3, See id.
at 13-67 (providing discussion of the Charter's provisions and indicating the
foreign
influences on each provision).
34 SeeDU PLESSIS & CORDER, supra note 31, at 48 (discussing
the influences behind the Bill of
Right's "structure").
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African National Congress's draft bill. M The drafters also noted that,
in addition, the technical committee also looked to analogously
framed bills of rights in other countries, including the German Basic
Law and the Canadian Constitution.56 Similarly, the impact of international human rights documents and the experiences of other
countries were also examined.3
As the democratic state of South Africa rejoined the community of
nations, previously scorned international covenants and other documents have been signed and ratified.38 Thus, this body of law has
taken on greater significance than before, although the extent of its
practical role can be questioned.
The expanded role of international law is explicitly addressed in
section 231(4) of the interim Constitution, which provides, "The
rules of customary international law binding on the Republic shall,
unless inconsistent with this Constitution or an Act of Parliament,
form part of the law of the Republic."" Thus, a particular human
rights standard, which has become accepted as a rule of customary
international law, must be implemented by a South African court in a
decision, unless this rule is incompatible with the Constitution or an
Act of Parliament. The proviso sets an important limit, permitting

parliamentary supremacy in this area as in the past. As then-Chief
Justice Rumpff stated in 1978 in Nduli and Another v. Minister ofJustice
'5 See id.at 449.

'6 See Hugh Corder, Toward a South African Constitution, 57 MODERN LR. 491, 514 (1994)
(noting that these foreign models were useful because they emphasized that rights should be
expressed simply and broadly, while remaining limitable and suspendable).
7 SeeDU PLESSIS & CORDER, supranote 31, at 4748.
M South Africa signed three major human rights treaties in 1994. These were the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3, the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, and the
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, Dec. 21,
1965, 660 U.N.T.S. 195. Three documents were ratified by South Africa in 1995: the Convention on the Rights of the Child, G. A. Res. 44/25, U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 166,
U.N. Doc.A/44/736 (1989); the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
Against Women, GA. Res. 34/180, U.N. GAOR, 34th Sess., Supp. No. 46, at 193, U.N. Doc.
A/34/36 (1980); and the three Protocols to the Geneva Convention. Parliament recommended ratification of two more, the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28,
1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 150, and the Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa, Sept. 10, 1969, 1001 U.N.T.S. 45. Although these latter two documents were
formally lodged in 1996, there has been little apparent further movement on this front. Only
two instruments were ratified in 1996: The African Charter on Human and 'Peoples' Rights,
Jun. 27, 1981, 21 I.LM. 58, and the Convention relating to the Status of RefugeesJuly 28, 1951,
189 U.N.T.S. 150. It appears, however, that neither the administrative arm of government nor
Parliament has a strategy for reviewing international human rights instruments or for determining whether to sign any others. 'Instruments have been signed and ratified without adequate
examination as to whether South African law complies with them. Thus, reservations were not
made and no review has occurred which might identify laws that should be amended to bring
them into line with ratified international treaties and the Government does not really understand South Africa's present obligations.
S. AFR. CONST. of 1993 (IC), ch. 4, § 231(4); see aLsoJOM-, DL'GARD.,
LNTER.,nATIO.C L Lw:
A SouTH AFRcAN PERSPECrIVE 339-41 (1994) (discussing the relevance of 231 (4)).
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and Others, " [c]ustomary international law40must give way to South African legislation if that legislation is clear."
International treaties also play a role in domestic South African
law since both constitutions provide that the President can negotiate
and sign international agreements.4 ' However, as a check on presidential power, the interim Constitution provided that until a treaty
was incorporated into South African law by an Act of Parliament, it
was not legally binding within the country or domestically enforceable. Furthermore, the signed agreement may not be inconsistent
with the Constitution.4 3 Thus, the few human rights agreements to
which South Africa is party,' will play a direct role in the law only after Parliament so provides. s The final Constitution provides that international agreements, except for agreements which are technical,
administrative or executive in nature, are binding on the Republic
only after they have been approved by resolution in both houses of
Parliament, the National Assembly and the National Council of Provinces. 46 In addition, an international agreement becomes law in
South Africa only "when it is enacted into law by national legislation.' , 47 However, a self-executing provision of an agreement approved by Parliament is law unless inconsistent with the Constitution
or an Act of Parliament. 4 Likewise, customary international law is
binding on South Africa unless inconsistent with the Constitution or

40 Nduli and Another v. Minister ofJustice and Others,
1978 (1) SALR 893, 898 (A).
41 See S. APR. CONST. of 1993 (IC), ch. 6, § 82(1)(i) ("The
President shall be competent

to ...negotiate and sign international agreements."); see also S. AFR. CONST. of 1996, ch. 14, §
231(1) ("The negotiating and signing of all international agreements is the responsibility of the
national executive.").
42 See S.Am CONST. of 1993 (IC), ch. 15, § 231(2-3). Section
231(2) qualified the President's power under Section 82(1)(i). See id. at § 231(2). Section 231(3) stated: "Where Parliament agrees to the ratification of or accession to an international agreement under subsection (2), such international agreement shall be binding on the Republic and shall form part of
the law of the Republic, provided Parliament expressly so provides and such agreement is not
inconsistent with this Constitution." Id.at 231(3).
43 See id.
Before 1993, South Africa was party only to the United Nations Charter. It
was only at the
beginning of 1994 that South African signed a number of conventions. These include the Convention on the Political Rights of Women, July 7, 1954, 193 U.N.T.S. 135; the Convention on
the Nationality of Married Women, Feb. 20, 1957, 309 U.N.T.S. 65; the Recommendation on
Consent to Marriage, Minimum Age for Marriage and Registration of Marriages, GA. Res. 2018,
U.N. GOAR, 20th Sess., Supp. No. 14, at 36, U.N. Doc. A/60141 (1965); the Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, GA. Res. 39/46, U.N. GAOR, 34th
Sess., Supp. No. 46, at 193, U.N. Doc. A/34/46 (1980); the Convention Against Torture and
other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, GA. Res. 44/25, U.N. GAOR,
39th Sess., Supp. No. 51, at 197, U.N. Doc A/39/51 (1985); and the Convention on the Rights
of the Child, U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 166, U.N. Doc. A/44/736 (1989).
45 See DermottJ. Devine, The RelationshipBetween International
Law and Municipal Law in Light
of the Interim South African ConstitutionAct 1993,44 INT'L & COmP. L.Q. 1, 6-7 (Jan. 1995).
46 SeeS. AFR. CONST. of 1996, ch.
14, § 231(2).
47 See id.
at § 231(4).
48 See id.

Fall 1998]

THE _F1ECT OFCONSTITUTIONAL BORROIS7VGS

an Act of Parliament.49 The courts are required, when interpreting
the Bill of Rights to, "consider international law," and "may consider
foreign law."
International influences also impacted the debate over which
rights ought to be incorporated into the interim Bill of Rights. This
controversial issue was fiercely debated by two main camps - the
minimalists and the optimalists. 52 The minimalists, represented
mainly by the African National Congress (ANC), argued that the
power to decide on inclusions or exclusions in an interim bill of
rights should not be in the hands of negotiators who had not been
elected and were therefore lacking democratic legitimacy." The optimalists, on the other hand, represented mainly by the white government, wanted as many rights included, with maximum detail, before majority rule began. As a result of necessary compromise, the
interim Bill of Rights contained only those fundamental rights which
negotiators could agree warranted protection during the transitional
period before a final constitution was adopted. While controversial
subjects such as abortion and the death penalty were discussed during negotiations, they were avoided during the drafting of the interim
Bill of Rights on the basis that such issues should be left for resolution in the drafting of the final Constitution. "
In addition, according to two of the technical drafters of the interim Bill of Rights, Lourens du Plessis and Hugh Corder, international instruments such as the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights (1948); the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights (1966); the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966); and the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (1950) served as
sources of inspiration."' Moreover, when there was controversy about
the form of provisions, the Technical Committee responsible for
drafting sought compromise in the wordings of these instruments.Y
Thus, for example, Section 8(3) (a), dealing with affirmative action, is
styled after a comparable provision in Article 1(4) of the International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination.58
The drafters also referred to the Bills of Rights of other counat ch. 14, § 232.
See id.
See i&at ch. 2, § 39 (1) (b).
51See i&at§ 39(1)(c).
52 See DU PLESSS & CoRDER, supranote 31, at 40-41 (discussing cxtensily the ideological

49

debates between the minimalists and the optimists).
" See id.
54

See id.

5 See ad at 47.

' See i&

57See id.

58See id,AzAR CACHALIA, Er
(1994) (discussing Section 8).

AL, FUNDA.MENrAL RIGHTS IN THE NEW CONSTrroN

2.4-32

JOURNAL OFCONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 1: 2

tries, 9 specifically the German Basic Law (1949), the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (1982), and the Chapter on Fundamental
Human Rights and Freedoms in the Constitution of the Republic of
Namibia (1990). 60 Thus many sections of the interim Bill of Rights
have origins, or at least comparable sections, in other bills of rights.
However, even more important to constitutional adjudication in
South Africa, was Section 35 (1) of the interim Constitution:
In interpreting the provisions of this Chapter a court of law
shall promote the values which underlie an open and
democratic society based on freedom and equality and
shall, where applicable, have regard to public international
law applicable to the protection of the rights entrenched in
this Chapter, and may have regard to comparable foreign
case law.6'
Thus, public international law is directly implicated in the South
African legal system. The role that it plays is governed by the wording
of this section, which states that a court "shall, where applicable" have
regard to these standards. The phrase both imposes an obligation
and confers discretion onto the courts to refer to and utilize these legal principles when performing their interpretive task.63 Since many
of the rights provided by Chapter 3 of the interim Constitution, and
Chapter 2 of the final Constitution, have internationally comparable
provisions, public international law, as applied by means of Section
35 (1) of the interim Constitution, assumes broad significance.f
Like all other bills of rights, the interim Bill of Rights adopted in
South Africa is a written text transmitting meaning by way of language. In the South African constitutional setting, as in arguably all
settings, the language of a legal text can be meaningless in the absence of context. Policy questions and value judgements are the keys
to interpreting and understanding judicial decisions, given the wide
scope of judicial review. Language, itself, is only one factor to be
weighed in evaluating constitutional decisions, and these decisions
cannot be understood unless considered in relation to the values subscribed to by the judges who themselves interpret the constitution.
This kind of interpretation is not exact and is often about making political choices.
See DU PLESSIS & CORDER, supra note 31, at 47-48.

ro See id. at 47.
6 S. AFR. CONST. of 1993 (IC), ch. 3, § 35(1). Section 35(1) has been replaced in the final
Constitution by Section 39. See S. AFR. CONST. of 1996, ch. 2, § 39. Section 39 seems to
strengthen the mandate to consider public law. The section states that a court "must consider
international law." Id. at § 39(1) (b).
62 See id.
63 SeeJohn Dugard, The Role of InternationalLaw in Interpreting the
Bill of Rights, 10 S. AFR. J.
HUM. RTs. 208, 212 (1994).
See id. at 212 (observing that "it is difficult to imagine situations where public
international law will not be applicable under 35 (1)," of the interim Constitution).
65 See T. Vallinder, The Judicialization of Politics: Meaning Forms, Background, Prospects, A-rA
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To determine the meaning of certain words, the courts might
look to the ends they seek to achieve." The limited usefulness of actual language is expressed by Section 35(2), which has its origins in
Canadian and German law.6 Section 35(2) states:
No law which limits any of the rights entrenched in this
Chapter, shall be constitutionally invalid solely by reason of
the fact that the wording used prima fade exceeds the limits
imposed in this Chapter, provided such a law is reasonably
capable of a more restricted interpretation which does not
exceed such limits, in which event such law shall be construed as having a meaning in accordance with the said
more restricted interpretation. cs
Section 35 (2) thus constitutionalizes the procedure known as "verfassungskonforme Auslegun' in Germany and "reading down" in Canada.69 This procedure provides that no law shall be invalid solely because a prima facie reading of the words used suggests that it exceeds
the limits imposed in the Bill of Rights as long as a more limited interpretation is possible.'0
The impact of international and comparative law is also found in
the limitation section, Section 33, of the interim Constitution. Section 33(1), reads:
The rights entrenched in this Chapter may be limited by law
of general application, provided that such limitation(a) shall be permissible only to the extent that it is(i) reasonable; and
(ii) justifiable in an open and democratic society
based on freedom and equalityi'; and
(b) shall not negate the essential content of the right in
question

and provided further that any limitation to(aa) a right entrenched in section 10, 11, 12, 4(1), 21, 25 or
SociErATISJURIDIcAE LUNDENSiS 267 (1992) (providing a critically important discussing of the
reciprocal relationship between politics and thejudiciary); Cass R. Sunstein. Neutrality in Conststutional Law (with Special Reference to Pornography. Abortion and Surnrgacy), 92 COLULi. L REv. 1
(1992) (arguing that neutrality is a key principle in constitutional law and theory); Peter H.
Russell, The PoliticalPurposes of the Canadian Ckarter of Rights and Frerdam. 61 CLN. B. REV. 30
(1983); Alfred Hill, The PoliticalDimension of ConstitutionalAdjudication, 63 S. CaL L REV. 1237
(1990).
6 See Nic Haysom, The Bill ofFundamentalRights: ImplicationsForLegal Praaie,DE REBuS 125,
128 (Feb. 1994).
6 SeeDU PLESSIS & CORDER, supranote 31, at 47,121.
S. Am'R. CONSr. of 1993 (IC), ch. 3, § 35(2).
6 SeeDu PLESSIS & CORDER, supra note 31, at 121.
70 See id.at 123.
7 See Catherine Albertyn &Janet Kentridge, Introducingthe Right to Equality m the Interm Constitution, 10 S. AFR.J. HuM. RTs. 149, 175 (1994) (observing that i[the inquiry under this section considers whether incursions into the freedom from discrimination are permissible because they serve a legitimate social purpose in a way which is proportionate to the end which
they seek to achieve").
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30(1) (d) or (e) or (2); or
(bb) a right entrenched in section 15, 16, 17, 18, 23 or 24, in
so far as such right relates to free and fair political activity,
shall, in addition to being reasonable as required in paragraph (a) (i), also be necessary.72

The requirement that a limitation must be accomplished through law
of general
application reflects Article 19(1) of the German Basic
73
...

Law.

Similarly, the stipulation in Section 33(1) (b) that limitations

on rights "shall not negate the essential content of the right in ques-

tion" is reminiscent of Article 19 (2) of the German Basic Law, 4 which
states that in "no
case may the core element of a basic right be en75
croached upon."
The limitation clause also owes a debt to Section 1 of the Canadian Charter. Section 1 states, "The Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms guarantees the rights and freedoms set out in it subject only

to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably
justified in a free and democratic society."76 The drafters of the interim Constitution critically examined the Canadian case of Regina v.
Oakes77 to extract the criteria for determining what is reasonable and
demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society. Oakes considered the values at the core of Section 1.78

The Oakes decision profoundly impacted the drafting of the interim Constitution. In Oakes, the Canadian Supreme Court decided
it would follow a two-stage process as the method of judicial review.79
The first stage requires the applicant to show how the legislation in
question infringes upon the rights and freedoms enshrined in the
Charter, both as a matter of interpretation and also as a matter of
fact."° In the second stage, the Court determines whether the law
adopted is reasonable and demonstrably justifiable.8 ' This allows the
S. Ar. CONST of 1996 (IC), ch. 3, § 33(1).
See Du PL.EsSIs & CORDER, supra note 31, at 123. Article 19(1) of the German
Basic Law
states, "[i]n so far as a basic right may, under the Basic Law, be restricted by or pursuant to a
law. The law shall apply generally and not merely to one case. Furthermore, the law shall specify the basic right and relevant Article." GRUNDGESETZ [Constitution] [GG] art. 19(1) (F.R.G.)
(Basic Law). The Basic Law was adopted by the parliamentary council of West Germany in
1949, following World War II, in an attempt to create a democratic political and social atmosphere.
74 See CAcHALIA, ET AL., supra note 58, at 115
(stating, however, that this prevision of South
Africa's interim Constitution is actually, "drawn from article 19(1) of the German Basic Law
[which] gives explicit recognition to the fact that what is at stake.., is legitimate circumscription of rights, not their evisceration," which is reiterated by Section 19(2) of the basic law).
75 GRUNDGESETZ [Constitution] [GG] art. 19(1)
(F.R.G.).
76 CAN. CONST. (Constitution Act, 1982) Pt. I (Canadian Charter
of Rights and Freedoms) §
72

73

Regina v. Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103.
See id. at 135-40 (applying the limitations test and explaining
its application).
79 See id
80See id at 135 ("any § 1 inquiry much be premised on an understanding
that the impugned
limit violates constitutional fights and freedoms").
81 See id. at 136 (stating that the court should only allow exceptions to the
Charter's guaran78
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state to justify the law by reference to its purpose and also its concurrence with a three-part proportionality test. To pass this hurdle in
Oakes, the state had to show the followingFirst, the measures adopted must be carefully designed to
achieve the objective in question. They must not be arbi-

trary, unfair or based on irrational considerations. In short,
they must be rationally connected to the objective. Second,
the means, even if rationally connected to the objective in
this first sense, should impair "as little as possible" the right
or freedom in question. Third, there must be a proportionality between the effects of the measures which are responsible for limiting the Charterright or freedom, and the
objective
which has been identified as of "sufficient impor"
tance. 82
These principles were absorbed into the interim Constitution,
particularly in the limitation clause."

The limitation section also has some roots in the European Convention on Human Rights. In making the Sunday Tinesh decision,
the European Court of Human Rights noted that:
The following are two of the requirements that flow from
the expression "prescribed by law." Firstly, the law must be
adequately accessible: The citizen must be able to have an
indication that is adequate in the circumstances of the legal
rules applicable to a given case. Secondly, a norm cannot
be regarded as "law" unless it is formulated with sufficient
precision to enable the citizen to regulate his conduct: He
must be able--if need be with appropriate advice-to foresee, to a degree that is reasonable in the circumstances, the
consequences which a given action may entail. Those consequences need not be foreseeable with absolute certainty:.
Experience shows this to be unattainable.3
Section 33(1) (a) further demands that a law, when it impinges on a
right, must meet the test of being "reasonable" and "justifiable in an
open and democratic society based on freedom and equality." 5
Thus, the interim Constitution called for proportionality: The various rights and laws impinging on those rights must be balanced.
The principle of proportionality is found in various international
and national contexts. It has been used to interpret the European
tees where the provision is "reasonably and demonstrably justified" for a 'free and democratic

society").

I2
1&at
139.
SeeS. Am CONST. of 1993 (IC), ch. 3, § 33; see also AcHALtIA, ETAL. supra note 58, at 10516 (describing international case law that influenced the construction of Section 33); DIL
PLEssis & CoRDER, supranote 31, at 122-33 (discussing limitation clause analysis).
84 The Sunday Times Case, 30 EUIL Cr. H.R. (ser. A.) 1 (1979).
85 Id- at 31.
S. AFIL CONST. of 1993 (IC), ch. 3, § 33(1) (a).
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Convention so limits can be placed on rights "only when it is necessary in the light of the interests advanced as weighed against the requirements of a democratic society.n 87 Proportionality is a testing
principle in a number of other countries in Europe,8 and requires
striking a balance between the competing interests by weighing the
advantages and disadvantages of the measure. In Germany, for example, when an individual's rights are to be affected, the state has to
meet three requirements--suitability, necessity and proportionality."
The courts, in that country, have incorporated proportionality within
the principle of the "least detrimental settlement."
The European experience is also evident in the inclusion in the
interim Constitution's limitation clause of the term "democratic society."92 Sieghardt points to the need for attention to
the needs or objectives of a democratic society in relation to
the right or freedom concerned; without a notion of such
needs, the limitations essential to support them cannot be
evaluated. For example, freedom of expression is based on
the need of a democratic society to promote the individual
self-fulfillment of its members, the attainment of truth, participation in decision-making and the striking of a balance
between stability and change. The aim is to have a pluralistic, open, tolerant society. This necessarily involves a delicate balance between the wishes of the individual and the
utilitarian "greater good of the majority." But democratic
societies approach this problem from the standpoint of the
importance of the individual, and the undesirability of restricting his or her freedom. 93
87 p. vAN DIJK & C. J. H. vAN HOOF, THEORY AND PRACTICE OF THE EUROPEAN
CONVENTION

OF HUMAN RIGHTS 583 (2nd ed. 1990).mSeeJeffreyJowell & Anothony Lester, ProportionalityNeither Novel norDangerous, in NEW DIRECTIONS INJUDICIAL REVIEw 51 (J.L. Jowell & D. Oliver, eds.
1988) (discussing the role of proportionality in English law through a historical analysis of proportionality in Europe); Harmut Gerstein & David Lowry, Abortion, Abstract Norms, and Social
Controk The Decision of the West GermanFederal ConstitutionalCourt, 25 EMORY LJ. 849 (1976) (describing the Constitutional Court's application of the principle of "least detrimental settlement"
to preserve the central constitutional value of human dignity in the context of abortion rights
where individual rights-those of the mother and fetus--compete).
89 See id. at 53-54.
90 See id. at 52-54 (defining the requirements for encroaching on individual
freedom).
91 See Gerstein & Lowry, supra note 88, at 865.
9, S. AFR. CONST. of 1993 (IC), ch. 3, § 33(1) (a)
(iii).
93 PAUL SIEGHART, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF HUMAN RIGHTS 93 (1983)
(discussing the
European Court of Human Right's interpretation of the phrase, "necessary in a democratic society," in Handysidev. United Kingdom, 24 EUR. CT. H.R. (ser. A)).
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Comparative jurisprudence was also used to determine whether
the term "necessary" should be included in the clause. "Necessary"
was defined by the European Court in the Handyside case ' as distinct
from "indispensable," "useful," "reasonable," or "desirable." ' The
court held that the context had to be looked at to determine what
was necessary within the "reality of the pressing social need."f
Similarly, the drafters borrowed from American jurisprudential
concepts in drafting the limitations clause. The drafters introduced
strict scrutiny to the limitations section through a clause of the interpretation provision.97 As a result, certain rights in the interim Constitution were protected by the strict scrutiny standard found in American constitutional jurisprudence. 98
.THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT

The view prevailed during negotiations that most of the judges
appointed prior to the transition were unsuited to decide constitutional issues because of their training, experience and temperament." Historically, the judiciary had been drawn from a very small
segment of the population. ' O' With the exception of one recent appointment, all of the approximately 130 Supreme Court judges were
white and all except one were male.'"' At the end of 1988, all of the
94 Handyside v. United Kingdom, 24 Eur. C. H.R. (ser. A.) (1976).

9 See id. at 22.
96 1&; see alsoSIEGHART, supra note 93,
at 66.
97 See S. AFR. CONST. of 1993 (IC), ch. 3, § 33; id. at § 35; DL' PLESSIS & CORDER. supra note
31, at 126-27 (discussing the relationship between these clauses and the application of the
American strict scrutiny test despite the limitation clauses roots in the Canadian and European
constitutions).
See DU PLESSIS & CORDER, supra note 31, at 127-28 (listing the rights subject to strict scrutiny review).
SeeJeremy Gaunflett, Appointing andPromotingJudges:lihaid Way Now? CoNsi:LTt's (South
Africa) 23 (1990) (on file with author);Jeremy Sarkin, Judges in South Africa: Bladk Sherp orA&bnos?, in 24 CENTRE FOR THE INDEPENDENCE OFJUDGES AND LWERS BULLET N (of the Intemational Commission of Jurists) (Geneva, Switzerland) 34, 37-38, 40-44 (1989) (on file with
author) (questioning whether judges' roles in perpetuating an unjust and illegitimate system
has tainted the credibility or that the good they can now do justifies their remaining on the
bench).
10 SeeJeremy Sarkin, The PoliticalRole of the South African ConstitutionalCourt,
114 S. Att. LJ.
134, 134-36 (1997) (considering the extent to which political parties may use Court to fight
their political battles); G. Barrie, The Challenge of the South AfricanJudidayin the 1990s T SKDaF
VAN SUiD AFRIKAANSE REG 515 (1989) (on file with author).
'0' See D.D. Mokgatle, The Exclusion of Blacksfrom thw South Afncan JudicialSystem, 3 S. .A. J.
Huht. RTS. 44, 45-46 (1987). The first person of color to sit on the Supreme Court %w Hassan
E. Mall, who was an acting judge for one month in 1987. S&e Michael Parks, South Affica ,a,.es
Ftrst Non-Wh9ile toju dalPost,L.A. TIMEsJan. 18, 1987, at 8. In August of 1991, Mr. Lsmail Mahomed became the first person of color appointed full time to the Supreme Court bench. Se
First Black Appointed to South Africa Supreme Court to Speah at Penn, LEGkL INTE.LIGEN1CER. Jan. 23,
1992, at 2.
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144 regional court magistrates were white, while of 782 district court
magistrates, 768 were white, 10 were Indian, 4 were colored and none
were black.102 Undoubtedly, the fact that the legal system was faced
with a crisis of legitimacy was due in part to its composition. 3 Whatever their personal political preferences, judges had spent their years
on the bench submitting to the heavy hand of the executive.' In the
past judges attempted to explain their role in the positivist tradition,
as declarers of the law and not its makers.'0 5 However, criticism of the
judges has often been predicated on a wider view of the judicial function. 0 6theThe
Apellat Law
.... Commission
107
. favored a constitutional court based in
the Appellate Division, while the Association of Law Societies of the
Republic of South Africa-the attorneys-proposed that the Supreme
Court be granted jurisdiction to hear constitutional and human
rights matters. '°s The Appellate Division would then hear appeals on
constitutional and human rights matters and other appeals on points
of law only'09 The African National Congress, however, supported
the creation of a constitutional court above the Appellate Division to
adjudicate on constitutional and human rights issues only. International experience was also invoked in support of the need for a constitutional court."0
The belief was that to leave the judiciary as then composed-exclusively white and almost exclusively male-while conferring on it
the added powers ofjudicial review, would be to allow law democratically enacted by the majority to be overturned by a court composed
of a partisan and insulated minority."' Some argued for the decen-

See Parliament of South Africa, Hansard,28 Apr. 1989 cols. 7097-98.
103See Charles R.M. Dlamini, The Influence of Race on the Administration ofJustice in
South
102

Africa,
4 S. AFR.J. HUM. RTS. 37, 53-54 (1988) (arguing that blacks distrusted the system in part because of its white composition).
104 See David Beatty, The Rule (and Role) of Law in New South Afnica: Some
Lessons Learned From
Abroad, 109 S. AFR. L.J. 408, 422 (1992).
105SeeDU PLESSIS & CORDER, supranote 31, at 67.
6 Id., at 67-72 (describing in brief the establishment of a criticism of the South Africanjudiciax7 as an scholarly discipline in South Africa and the major theories of criticism.).
See SA LAW COMMISSION, 3 CONSTITUTIONAL MODELS (PROJECr 77) 1200-01.
The full Association of Law Societies proposal is reprinted in ALS Proposes New Legal DispensationforSouth Africa 1990 DE REBUS 587.
'o See id.
110The Conference on a Constitutional Court took place in 1991 with a
range of international speakers evaluating different court models. See V. Moreina, The Portuguese Constitutional
Court, (1991) (paper delivered at the Conference on a Constitutional Court) '(on file with
author); see also Kader Asmal, ConstitutionalCourts - A ComparativeSurvey, 24 ComP. & INT'L L.J.
S. AFR. 315, 337-40 (1991);J. Van der Westhuizen, The Protectionof Human Rights and a Constitutional Court for South Africa: Some Questions and Ideas, With Reference to the German Experience, DE
JURE 1 (1991) (on file with author).
I SeeJohan D. van der Vyver, The Randolph W. Thrower Symposium, Comparative Constitutionalism: Constitutional Options for Post-Apartheid South Africa, 40 EMORY LJ. 745, 802-4 (1991) (discussing proposals for a constitutional court and the arguments made in support of different
structures).
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tralization of the constitutional powers of the courts.12 Within this
model, as in the United States, all courts would have constitutional
testing powers and would be able to strike down legislation or administrative acts that overstepped constitutional boundaries. '
South African critics of the decentralized model argued that even
if more new judges were appointed, the old judges would still benefit
from the enhanced judicial powers for which they were ill suited.""
Proponents of a constitutional court therefore argued that only one
court, meticulously selected and well balanced, should have the powers of constitutional review."
Criticism of the central court idea
came from those who believed that such appointments would be
more politically inspired than the elevation of judges from other
courts.' 16 These critics argued that granting all courts review powers

would ensure that a human rights culture would permeate the entire
legal order.17 They further argued that judges deciding constitutional issues should not be insulated from the cut and thrust of daily
courtroom litigation, as this is an essential element ofjudicial experience and provides the necessary training and proficiency for constitutional adjudication.
In terms of the interim Constitution, the outcome of this debate
was the creation of the Constitutional Court, above the Appellate Division, to adjudicate on constitutional and human rights issues only."-"
Under the interim Constitution, the Appellate Division was denied
jurisdiction "to adjudicate any matter within the jurisdiction of the
Constitutional Court.""9 In the final Constitution, however, all the
higher courts are given powers of constitutional review."' The power
to strike down a parliamentary statute, however, resides only with the
Constitutional Court, which must affirm the decision of 2the lower
court before the lower court's decision has the force of law.'
The procedure for appointing judges to the Constitutional Court
"1 See Arthur Chaskalson, A Constitutional Court: Jurisdiction,
Possible Models and Questions of Access, 95 (1991) (paper delivered at the Constitutional Court Conference) (on file
with author).
11 See Haysom, The Bil ofFundamentalRights, supra note 66. at 126.
1 SeeSarldn, supra note 100, at 134. But see M.G. Cowling.Judgas and
the P1roetinof Humian
Pits inSouth Afia." ArtculatingthelnadiculatePremiss,
3 S. AFR.J. HUM. RTS. 177.195 (1987).
See van der Vyver, supra note 111, at 802 (revieuing the %iews of the Olivier Commison
and the African National Congress); see generalyDU PLESSIS & CORDER. supra note 31, at 191-200
(discussing the proposals for the enforcement mechanisms needed to protect the fundamental
rights provided in the interim Constitution).
116 Seevan der Vyver, supra note 111, at 802.
11 See id.
See S. AFR. CONsT. of 1993 (IC), ch. 7, § 98.
1 Id. at ch. 7, § 101.
IN SeeS. AFX. CONsr of 1996, ch.8,§§ 168, 169.
12 See id. at § 167(5). Section 167(5) states, "The Constitutional Court makes
the final decision whether an Act of Parliament, a provincial Act or conduct of the President is constitutional, and must confirm to any order of invalidity made by the Supreme Court of Appeal, a
High Court, or a court of similar status, before that order has any force." Id.
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is set out in the interim Constitution.
Discussions over the procedure generated great controversy during the multi-party talks that
preceded finalization of the Constitution. The controversy reflected
recognition that the judicial appointments might determine the outcome of constitutional decisions. To protect the judicial structure
and maintain public confidence in the legitimacy of the Court's decisions, the drafters sought to avoid a politicized appointment system.
Thus, the drafters departed from the 1highly
political appointment
23
procedure followed in the United States.
The interim Constitution provided that the President of the Constitutional Court and the ten other udges are appointed for a nonrenewable period of seven years, and must be South African citizens, 2 6 who are "fit and proper person[s]." 127 Further, the interim

Constitution required that candidates either be judges of the Supreme Court, have been advocates, attorneys or law lecturers for a
minimum of ten years, 28 or, as a result of training or experience, have
expertise in the field of constitutional law.'29 Not more than two
judges could be chosen from this latter category of persons. 30 In fact
all eleven judges appointed were lawyers. The composition has, and
will continue to have, profound repercussions for the type of decisions handed down. Non-lawyers on the Court might have ensured a
movement away from a strict legalistic approach.
Under the Constitution, the President of the Court must be appointed by the President of South Africa, "in consultation with the
cabinet and after consultation with the Chief Justice."'3' The President, however, must choose the President of the Court from a list of
four names supplied by the Judicial Services Commission. The first
appointment to the office of President of the Court was exempted

1
123

See S. AFR. CONST. of 1993 (IC), ch. 7, § 99.

See LAWRENCE BAUM, THE SUPREME COURT

30-60 (6th ed. 1998) (reviewing the selection

process of the United States Supreme Courtjustices).
124 See id at § 98(1) ("There shall be a Constitutional Court consisting of a President and 10
otherjudges appointed in terms of Section 99.").
2
See id. at § 99(1) ("[T]he judges of the Constitutional Court shall be appointed by the
President for a non-renewable period of seven years.").
126 See id. at § 99(2) (a) ("No person shall be qualified
to be appointed President or ajudge of
the Constitutional Court unless he or she - (a) is a South African citizen.").
127 Id. at § 99(2)(b) ("No person shall be qualified to be appointed
President or a judge of
the Constitutional Court unless he or she... (b) is a fit and proper person to be ajudge of the
Constitutional Court.").
1
See id. at § 99(2) (c) (i). This section requires that a candidate "is a judge of the Supreme
Court or is qualified to be admitted as an advocate or attorney and has, for a cumulative period
of at least 10 years after having so qualified, practiced as an advocate or an attorney or lectured
in law at a university." Id.
'2 See id. at § 99(2)(c)(ii). Section 99(2) (c) (ii) allows for ajustice to
be "a person who, by
reason of his or her training and experience, has expertise in the field of constitutional law
relevant to the application of this Constitution and the law of the Republic." Id.
130 See id. at § 99(4).
1
Id. at § 97(2) (a).
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from this requirement,'3 2 and the President was left free to appoint
any person who met the requirements laid down for appointment.'
Arthur Chaskalson was appointed first President of the Constitutional Court. Four more of the judges of the Court were appointed
from the ranks of existing judges by President Mandela, "in consultation with the Cabinet and with the Chief Justice.""' Sitting judges,
therefore, make up a large component of the Court, but those selected represented the more progressive sector of the existing judiciary.
Following the interim Constitution's requirements, the remaining
six judges of the Constitutional Court were appointed by the President, "in consultation with the cabinet and after consultation with the
President of the Constitutional Court. " '35 For the first set of appointments, the six were selected from a motivated list of ten submitted by the Judicial Service Commission.'"6 Had Mandela not wanted
to appoint any of the nominees, he would have had to furnish reasons to the Commission,' s7 and the Judicial Service Commission
would have been required to provide another list of names from
which the President would have been obliged to appoint sixjudges."s
In 1994, theJudicial Service Commission had seventeen members,
who were:
(1)the Chief Justice, who shall preside at meetings of the
Commission (Judge M. Corbett);
(2)the President of the Constitutional Court (Judge A.
Chaskalson);
(3) one Judge President designated by the Judge Presidents
of the various divisions of the Supreme Court (judge J. A.
Howard of Natal);
(4)the Minister responsible for the administration ofjustice
or his or her nominee (Advocate D. Omar);
I See id at § 99(6).
133 Id.
11 S. AFR. CONST. of 1993 (IC), ch. 7, § 99(3). These judges were: Laurie Ackerman,
judge
of the Cape Provincial Division and formerly Professor of Human Rights at the University of
Stellenbosch, Ismail Mohammed, judge of the Transvaal Provincial Division, Richard Goldstone, judge of the Apellate Division and chairperson of the Goldstone Commission, and Thole
Madala of the Transkei Supreme Court. See Patrick Lawrence & Gail Inin, lWlatdgs of the Constitution, STAR (South Africa), Feb. 13, 1995, at 13.
S. AFR. CONST. of 1993 (IC), ch. 7, § 99(4).
See id. at § 99(5) (a) ("In respect of the first appointment after the commencement of the
Constitution of the six judges referred to in subsection (4), the Judicial Service Commission
shall submit a list often nominees.").
"7 See id. at § 99(5) (b) ("If the appointing authorities decide not to accept any or some of
such recommendations, theJudicial Service Commission shall be informed thereof and be furnished with reasons therefore.").
'3 See i&i at § 99(5) (c) ("After having been informed in terms of paragraph (b), theJudicial
Service Commission shall, in accordance with paragraph (a), submit further recommendations.
whereafter the appointing authorities shall make the appointment or appointments from the
recommendations as supplemented in terms of this paragraph.").
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(5-6)two practicing advocates designated by the advocates'
profession (Advocate Trengrove and Advocate Moerane);
(7-8) two practicing attorneys designated by the attorneys'
profession (Mr. L. van Zyl and Mr. N. Mojapelo);
(9)one professor of law designated by the deans of all the
law faculties at South African universities (Professor E.
Mureinik of the University of the Witwatersrand);
(10o-13)four senators designated en bloc by the Senate by
resolution adopted by a majority of at least two-thirds of all
its members (I. Direko, E. Mchunu and B. Ngcuka, all of
the ANC, and R. Radue of the National Party); and
(14-17)four persons, two of whom shall be practicing attorneys or advocates, who shall be designated by the President
in consultation with the Cabinet (D. Gordon SC, G. Bizos
SC, K. Moroka, andJ. Erentsen).
On the occasion of the consideration of matters specifically relating to a provincial division of the Supreme Court, the Judge President of the relevant division and the premier of the relevant province
are included as part of the Commission as well.'39 Crucially, the
Commission
is and
continue to be composed largely of members
•
r.
•will140
of the legal profession.
The process of appointment to the Constitutional Court has
played and will play a pivotal role in determining the character of the
bench, marking a distinct departure from the judiciary of the apartheid order. The dominance of older white men has given way to a
diversity in age, gender, religion and outlook.'4 ' This has had a major
effect on the type of decision handed down by the Court, although
the narrow spectrum of political leanings among the Justices of the
Constitutional Court is of crucial significance.
It is not surprising,
therefore, that a high level of concurrence has characterized the decisions of the court to date. 3 In addition, several of the rulings indicate that the Court will permit Parliament to decide policy and govern with very limited judicial hindrance.'"
However, many of the decisions of the Court are victories for de139 See id. at§ 105(1).
140

SeeBeatty, supra note 104, at 425 (1992) (explaining that the Judicial Services Commission

in South Africa "tend[s] to be dominated (either numerically or interpersonally or both) by
senior members of the judiciary and the legal profession-the two groups with the strongest
connections and (psychological) commitments to the past").
141 See Lawrence & Irwin, supra note 134, at 13 (providing
biographical information about
each of the eleven justices). But cf. Bob Drogin, 11 Activists Sworn in forNew S. African Court, L.A.
TMES, Feb. 15, 1995, at A8 (noting that some "critics have called the new court too white, too
male and too stacked with partisans of the ANC").
142 SeeDrogin, supra note 141, atA8.
1 Since the Constitutional Court first convened, it has decided most of its cases without dissent. See, e.g., State v. Makwanyane, 1995 (3) SALR 391 (CC) (containing 10 concurring opinions).
144 See infra notes 189-200 and accompanying
text.
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mocracy and human rights. Decisions handed down include the abolition of the death penalty'14 and juvenile corporal punishment as sentencing options,'4 the outlawing of civil imprisonment for debt,"7 and
the recognition of a right of access to police dockets and to consult
state wimesses.'4 Additionally, many decisions were related to the
right to a fair trial, as well as to issues of equality,' privacy,"t freedom
5
' provincial powers,5 2 and the application of the Bill of
of expression,
53
Rights.
IV.COMPARATIVE AND INIERNATIONAL LM.W
IN THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT

See Makwanyane, 1995 (3) SALR 391 (holding that capital punishment violates the right
to life, dignity, and to be free from cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment guaranteed by the
South African constitution).
1
See State v. Williams and Another, 1995(3) SALR 632 (CC) (holding that juvenile corporal
punishment violates various sections of the interim Constitution).
14
See Coetzee v. Government of the Republic of South Africa; Matiso and Others v. Commanding Officer, Port Elizabeth Prisons and Others, 1995 (4) SALR 631 (CC) (holding that the
imprisonment of debtors might violate the Constitution); Danie Olivier, Chil Imprisonwmeat Held
To Be Unconstitutional?,DE REBUS, Nov. 1995, at 701 (discussing Co.&e).
1
See Shabalala and Others v. Attorney-General of Transmaal and Another, 1996 (1) .ALR
725 (CC) (finding that the interim Constitution contained the right for defendants to access
police dockets and witnesses); Danie Olivier, Recent ConstitutionalCases DE REBuS,Jan. 1996, at
35-36 (discussing Shabala/a).
'
SeeIn re The School Education Bill of 1995 (Gauteng), 1996 (3) SALR 165 (CC) (upholding disputed sections of the School Education Bill of 1995 relating to the use of language and
religion to segregate schools); Nel v. Le Roux, 1996 (3) SALR 562 (CC); Case and Another v.
Minister of Safety and Security and Others; Curtis v. Minister of Safety and Security and Others,
1996 (3) SALR 617 (CC); Du Plessis and Another v. De Klerk, 1996 (3) SAR 850 (CC); Besserglik v. inister of Trade, Industry and Tourism, 1996 (4) SALR 331 (CC) (holding that leave to
appeal is constitutional); Brink v. Kitshoff, 1996 (4) SALR 197 (CC) (affirming right to equality
before the law).
158 See Case and Another, supra note 149; Curtis, supra ; Du Plessis and Another. supra note
149 ; Key v. Attorney-General, Cape of Good Hope, 1996 (4) SALR 187 (CC) (defining a *fairness standard" for the admission of evidence obtained by search and seizure); Bernstein and
Others v. Bester NO and Others, 1996 (2) SALR 751 (CC); Rudolph and Another v. Commissioner for Inland Revenue, 1996 (4) SALR 552 (CC) (holding that te interim Constitution
does not apply to search and seizure issues arising before the constitution came into force); In
Amendment Bill of 1995. 1996 (4) SALR 642
re Kwazulu-Natal Amakhosi and Iziphakanye
(CC); In re Payment of Salaries and Other Privileges to Ingon)ama Bill of 1995, 1996 (4) SAL.
653 (CC) (holding that bills prohibiting or limiting remuneration of traditional leaders to those
required by provincial law or custom do not violate the constitution).
I See Case and Another, supra note 149 ; Curtis, supra note 149 ; Du Plessis and Another,
supra note 149 ; Gardener v. Whitaker, 1996 (4) SALR 337 (CC); Bernstein and Others, supra
note 150 ; In re Kwazulu-Natal Amakhosi and Iziphakanyeua Amendment Bill of 1995, supra
note 150; In re Payment of Salaries and Other Privileges to Ingonyama Bill of 1995. supra note
150.
L& See Executive Council of the Western Cape Legislature and Others v. President of the Republic of South Africa and Others, 1995 (4) SALR 877 (CC) (clarif)ing the boundaries of central and provincial government authority); In re Kuazul-Natal Amakhosi and lziphakan)ewa
Amendment Bill of 1995, supranote 150; In re Payaient of Salaries and Other Privilegcs to Ingonyama Bill of 1995, supranote 150; In re School Education Bill of 1995 (Gauteng) 1996 (3)
SALR 617 (CC); In re National Education Policy Bill No 82 of 1995, 1996 (4) BCLR 518 (CC).
1
See eg., Du Plessis and Another v. De Klerk, supra note 149.
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General international experience indicates that national courts
often look to international human rights instruments, foreign law
and foreign judicial opinions for assistance in interpreting their domestic human rights documents. Therefore, the relevance and usefulness of international and comparative law in the context of South
African judicial interpretation-as opposed to constitutional creation-merits examination.154
This comparative process assists judges in defining the meaning of
various clauses that have counterparts in international law, assessing
what is reasonable, and in determining reasonable limitations on
rights.' 5 The use of these bodies of law by the Constitutional Court
can be determined by examining the role they have played in various
decisions by the Court.
The death penalty case of State v. Makwanyane and Another,"' was
the first case heard by the Constitutional Court. 57 Argument took
place before the Court between February 15 and February 17, 1995."'
The judgment, handed down on June 6, 1995, considered Section
277 of the Criminal Procedure Act and unanimously declared the
death penalty unconstitutional. 5 9 The main judgment, with which all
the other justices concurred, although sometimes for differing reasons,160was written by the Court's President, Justice Arthur Chaskalson.
The Court determined that use of the death penalty would violate
Section 11 (2) of the Constitution, which reads: "No person shall be
subject to torture of any kind, whether physical, mental or emotional,
nor shall any person be subject to cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment. "'s61Various other provisions of the Constitution were also found relevant to the inquiry, including the right to
life, which reads: "Every person shall have the right to life;' ' 6 2 and the
right to dignity which reads: "Every person shall have the right to re154 See, e.g., Claydon & Hatfield, supra note 8, at 354-59 (discussing the use of international
sources to interpret the Canadian Bill of Rights, which like the South African Bill of Rights, was
influenced in its construction by external legal sources).
155 See id. at 354-55.
156 1995 (3) SALR
391 (CC).
157 See id see generallyJeremy Sarkin, Problems and Challenges FacingSouth
Africa's Constitutional
Court:An Evaluation of its Decisions on Capitaland CorporalPunishment, 113 S. AFR. LJ. 71 (1996)
(discussing the Constitutional Court's opinions in Makwanyane and State v. Williams & Others,
1995 (3) SALR 632 (CC)); P.M. Maduna, The Death Penalty and Human Rights, 12 S. AFR.J. HUM.
RTS. 193 (1996) (providing a detailed discussion of the Makwanyane decision and its social context); G .Carpenter, ConstitutionalCourt Sounds the Death Knellfor CapitalPunishment,59 TYDSKRF
VIR HEDENDAAGSE ROMEINS-HOLLANDSE REG 145 (1996) (on file with author);J Milton, Demise
of the DeathPenalty: The ConstitutionalCourt Pronounces,8 S.AFR.J. CRIM.JusT. 188-204 (1995).
158 See Makwanyane, 1995 (3) SALR at 391.
19 It is still possible for the death penalty to be imposed
where an individual is convicted for
treason while South Africa is at war.
160 See Makwanyane 1995
(3) SALR at 401-53.
61 Id. at 451; see also S. AFR. CONST. of 1993 (IC), ch. 3, § 11(2).
162 Makwanyane, 1995 (3) SALR at 429-32; see
also S. AFR. CONST. of 1993 (IC), ch. 3, § 9.
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spect for and protection of his or her dignity." 163 The Court also investigated arbitrariness and inequality in the imposition of the death
penalty.'"
In arriving at its decision, the Court considered foreign law on the
topic. The Court considered the decisions of the courts of Hungary,
Tanzania, the Privy Council and the European Court of Human
Rights. 165 In Makwanyane, the Court stated that both binding and
non-binding public international lav may be used as tools of interpretation:
International agreements and customary international law
provide a framework within which Chap[ter] 3 can be
evaluated and understood, and for that purpose decisions
of tribunals dealing with comparable instruments, such as
the United Nations Committee on Human Rights, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, and the
European Court of Human Rights, and in appropriate
cases, reports of specialized agencies such as the International Labour Organization may provide guidance as to the
correct interpretation of particular provisions.""
The Court also held in Makwanyane that comparable bills of rights
and their jurisprudence would have enhanced importance until
South Africa developed its own indigenous jurisprudence.'('
The Constitutional Court has stated, however, that foreign cases
-will not provide clear answers to questions around the interpretation
of the South African Bill of Rights. In fact, various statements from
the court have warned against the use of foreign law because of the
"different contexts within which other constitutions were drafted, the
different social structures and milieu existing in those countries as
compared with those in this country, and the different historical
backgounds against which the various constitutions came into being.
In a case which went to the Constitutional Court on abstract review, the court was asked to rule on the constitutional validity of the
controversial Gauteng School Education Bill.' The argument put to
the Court was that certain sections of the law conflicted with various
rights entrenched in the interim Constitution."0 The possibly offending sections of the local bill prohibited public schools from conducting language-competence tests as an admission requirement, and
placed a duty on schools to promote a policy which fostered respect
'63

Makwtanyane 1995 (3) SALR at 422-24; see aLsoS. AFR. CosT. of 1993 (IC). ci. 3. § 10.

See Makvanyane, 1995 (3) SALR at 417-22.
See id.at 425-27.
16 Id at 414.
167 See id
'16 Park-Ross v. Director, Office of Serious Economic Offenses. 1995 (2) S.ALR 148, 160 (CC).
'6' SeeIn re Gauteng Education Bill of 1995, 1996 (3) SALR 165 (CC).
170 See i& at 170-71.
4
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for different religious tenets and protected
the right of pupils not to
7
attend religious instruction classes. '
Reviewing the Constitution and interpreting the relevant sections,
the Court found that the law was not unconstitutional in respect of
the objections raised by the petitioners. Justice Mahomed wrote the
main opinion in which he referred to the Canadian Charter of Rights
and Freedoms and cases decided by the Canadian courts, considering
Charter provisions and French and English language requirements in
Canadian schools. 72 Justice Sachs wrote a concurring decision investigating the applicability and relevance of international human rights
law to minority rights in South Africa, in particular whether minorities have the right to state educational institutions based on a common culture, language, or religion. 173 Justice Sachs examined the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the International
Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights, the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, the role of the League of Nations and
the United Nations in promoting and protecting human and minority rights as well as decisions of the Permanent Court of International
Justice.
His conclusion was that, "the central theme that runs
through the development of international human rights law in relation to protection of minorities, is that of preventing discrimination
against disadvantaged and marginalised groups, guaranteeing them
full and factual equality and providing for remedial action to deal
with past discrimination."'75 Thus, in justice Sachs' opinion, the principles of international law counseled against the Petitioners' claim for
continual preference of the "functional majority"
to maintain "lan76
guage exclusivity in relatively affluent schools."
Among the Court's more controversial decisions was the ruling
upholding the validity of the amnesty provisions of the Truth Commission legislation, 77 despite strong arguments that they violated the
right of access to court as well as norms of international law. At the
crux of the battle over the constitutionality of the Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act of 1995, Act 34,178 was whether
171

See id.
See id. at 175-76 (distinguishing Section 32(C) of the interim Constitution from
Section 23
of the Canadian Charter because the Canadian Charter places an explicit affirmative duty on
the Canadian Government to provide education in both English and French).
173 See id. at 186 n.6, 190-208 (Sachs,J., concurring).
174 See id. at 190-97.
175 Id. at 206.
172

176

Id.

See Azanian Peoples Organization (AZAPO) and Others v. President of the Republic of
South Africa and Others, 1996 (4) SALR 671 (CC); see generallyJeremy Sarkin, The Trials and
Tribulationsof the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 12 S. AFR. J. HUM. RTs. 617
(1996); Jeremy Sarkin, The Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa, CoMM. L. BULL.
(1997).
178 Parliament enacted the Promotion of National Unity
and Reconciliation Act in 1995 pursuant to the authority contained in the epilogue of the interim Constitution. See AZAPO, 1996
177
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removing civil remedies from victims of human rights abuses was in
conflict with the provision in the Constitution reading- "Every person
shall have the right to have justiciable disputes settled by a court of
law or, where appropriate, another independent and impartial forum."1' The applicants relied partly on the argument that the Act
violates a peremptory norm of international law which provides rights
to individual victims of war crimes regardless of the attitude of the
state. 180
The decision of Azanian People's Organization and Others v. The
Presidentof the Republic of South Afica and Others was handed down on
July 25, 1996, with the Court unanimously upholding the validity of
Section 20(7) of the Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation
Act.1 ' The main issues the court examined were whether the interim
Constitution permitted amnesty and, if so, whether it permitted amnesty from criminal prosecution only or from civil liability as well.'"
The Court began its evaluation of the constitutionality of the relevant section by agreeing that unless there is some provision in the
Constitution which authorized violations of rights protected in the
Constitution, then any law which violates those rights would be unconstitutional1es The Court then indicated how both the post-amble
and Section 33(1) of the interim Constitution (the limitations clause)
permitted rights protected by the Constitution to be circumscribed.
In evaluating whether amnesty is permissible for criminal acts, the
Court noted that
The Act seeks to address this massive problem by encouraging these survivors and the dependents of the tortured and
the wounded, the maimed and the dead, to unburden their
grief publicly, to receive the collective recognition of a new
nation that they were wronged, and crucially, to help them
to discover what did in truth happen to their loved ones,
where and under what circumstances it did happen, mad
who was responsible. That truth, which the victims of re-

(4) SALR at 677; see also S. AFP. CoNsT. of 1993. The commission was conceited as a method of
healing the wounds of apartheid. See AZAPO, 1996 (4) SALR at 677,684.
15-9.
AFR. CONST. of 1993 (IC), ch. 3,22(l).o SeAZAPO, 1996 (4) S.AR at 687-.
1 Deputy President Mahomed wrote the main opinion. Justices Chasadson. Ackermann,
Eriegler, Langa, Madala, Mokgoro, O'Regan and Sachs concurred. Justice Didcoutt agreed
with the findings ofJustice Mahomed but wrote separately.
182 For an evaluation of the most important prosecution for human rights abuses
committcd,
see Howard Varney &Jeremy Sarkin, Failingto Piteer the Hit Sqnad leil: An Anahs of thr Malan
Tria 10 S. AFR.J. CRIM.J. 141 (1997).
18 SeeAZAPO, 1996 (4) SALR at 681.
The Court explained that the epilogue gave Parliament the power to
184 See id. at 682-83.
grant amnesty. See id Section 33(1) allows laus of general application to limit rights granted by
the interim Constitution as long as the law does not negate the -essential content" of the right
and is reasonable, justified and, depending on the right in question, necessan. See S. At
CONsT. of 1993 (IC), ch. 3, § 33(1).
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pression seek so desperately to know is, in the circumstances, much more likely to be forthcoming if those responsible for such monstrous misdeeds are encouraged to
disclose the whole truth with the incentive that they will not
receive the punishment which they undoubtedly deserve if
they do. Without that incentive there is nothing to encourage such persons to make the disclosures and to reveal the
truth which persons in the positions of the applicants so
desperately desire. With that incentive, what might unfold
are objectives fundamental to the ethos of a new constitutional order. 5
Noting further that Parliament "not only has the authority in
terms of the epilogue to make a law providing for amnesty... it is in
fact obliged to do so,"'s 6 the Court opined that the granting of amnesty is both necessary to achieve reconciliation and to "facilitate the
consolidation of new democracies."' 87 Moreover, this approach had
been accepted in various other countries which also set up truth
commissions to ameliorate similar historical difficulties.'8M
Unfortunately, in considering whether international law permits
South Africa to grant amnesty, the Court narrowly found that the
Constitution permits an Act of Parliament to override international
law, 89 and that international law does not become enforceable in
South Africa until it is "incorporated into the municipal law by legislative enactment." ' 9° However, despite this holding, the Court did
find that, regardless of whether international law is trumped by domestic law, international law, particularly in the Geneva Protocols,
did not outlaw amnesty, particularly with regard to the types of circumstances that existed in South Africa during the period under
scrutiny.'9' The Court noted that international acceptance of truth
commissions was based on a
distinction between the position of perpetrators of acts of
violence in the course of war (or other conflicts between
states or armed conflicts between liberation movements
seeking self-determination against colonial and alien domination of their countries), on the one hand, and their position in respect of violent acts perpetrated during other con-

is AZAPO, 1996 (4) SALR at 684.
186Id. at 682-83.
187 Id. at 686.
18SSee id. at 686-87 (discussing the countries of Chile, Argentina and El Salvador which also
formed truth commissions to help repair the damage created by a history of subjugation).
,89See id. at 688-89. The Court supported this argument with reference to Section 231 of the
interim
See id.
190Id.Constitution.
at 686.
191See id. at 690 (discussing article 6(5) of the Protocol II of the Geneva Convention of
1949).
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flicts which take place within the territory of a sovereign
State in consequence of a struggle between the armed
forces of that state and other dissident armed forces operating under responsible command, within such a State on the
other. In respect of the latter category, there is no obligation on the part of a contracting state to ensure the prosecution of those who might have performed acts of violence
or other acts which [sic] would ordinarily be characterized
as serious invasions of human rights.'9 "
Proceeding to consider whether the granting of amnesty in respect to civil liability is an infringement of constitutionally protected
rights, the Court agreed that while amnesty is capable of being construed in the limited sense of immunity borrowed from criminal law,
it is also capable of a much broader interpretation."' In arriving at
the conclusion that amnesty includes immunity from civil liability, the
Court stated:
Central to the justification of amnesty in respect of the
criminal prosecution for offenses committed during the
prescribed period with political objectives is the appreciation that the truth will not effectively be revealed by the
wrongdoers if they are to be prosecuted for such acts. That
justification must necessarily and unavoidably apply to the
need to indemnify such wrongdoers against civil claims for
payment of damages. Without that incentive the wrongdoer
cannot be encouraged to reveal the whole truth which
might inherently be against his or her material or proprietary interests. There is nothing in the language of the epilogue which persuades me that what the makers of the Constitution intended to do was to encourage wrongdoers to
reveal the truth by providing for amnesty against criminal
prosecution in respect of their acts but simultaneously to
discourage them from revealing that truth by keeping intact
the threat that such revelations might be visited with what
might in many cases be very substantial claims for civil damages. It appears to me to be more reasonable to infer that
the legislation contemplated in the epilogue would, in the
circumstances defined, be wide enough to allow for an amnesty which would protect a wrongdoer who told the truth
from both the criminal and the civil consequences of his or
her admissions.' 94
Regarding the civil liability of the state for these wrongdoings, the
Court asserted that constraints on resources are key to a determination of whether the state ought to bear responsibility for the harm

2
19s

Id. at 689-90.

See id at 692-93 (defining amnesty and its Greek origin as being an 'act of oblihion).

194 I& at

693.
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and damages suffered by victims. 95' Evident here is the tendency for
the Court to act reluctantly rather than robustly in certain matters.
This tendency is apparent in at least eight highly political decisions,"'
including the Court's decision relating to the certification of the final
Constitution.197 These cases highlight the limited degree to which the
Court has been willing to play an interventionist role and reflect the
Court's extreme caution about interfering with political choices
made by the government. A similar caution has been made evident
in cases relating to resource allocation,' and it seems that resource
prioritization will depend solely on government determination. In
addition, various Constitutional Court opinions indicate the Court's
inclination to allow Parliament to determine policy and govern with
very little judicial interference. The following comment from the decision under discussion serves as illustration
Those negotiators of the Constitution and leaders of the nation who
were required to address themselves to these agonizing problems
must have been compelled to make hard choices. They could have
chosen to direct that the limited resources of the state be spent by
giving preference to the formidable delictual claims of those who
had suffered from acts of murder, torture or assault perpetrated by
servants of the state, diverting to that extent, desperately needed
funds in the crucial areas of education, housing and primary health
care. They were entitled to permit a different choice to be made be-

195 See id. at 694-95 ("The resources of the State have to deployed
imaginatively, wisely, effi-

ciently, and equitably to facilitate the reconstruction process.").
196 See, e.g., Executive Council, Western Cape Legislature v. Presidents
of the Republic of
South Africa, 1995 (4) SALR 877, 904-905 (CC) (allowing Parliament to take action without
following Constitutional procedures in exceptional circumstances); Premier, Kwazulu-Natal v.
President of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (1) SALR 769, 783-84 (CC) (establishing a liberal check on constitutional amendments); Sarkin, supra note 100, at 149-50 (discussing the
Court's deference to Parliament regarding policy determinations which allows Parliament to
"govern with very little judicial interference").
197
..
The interim Constitution mandated that the Constitutional Court determine the
validity
of the final Constitution. See S. AFR. CONST. of 1993 (IC), ch. 5, § 71 (2). The Court had to determine whether the text fell within the political pact negotiated before the 1994 elections and
recorded in thirty-four constitutional principles in the interim Constitution. Again, the Court
interpreted its brief narrowly, displaying a reluctance to be seen as interfering with and upsetting a carefully crafted political compromise. See Ex parte Chairperson of the Constitutional
Assembly; In re Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (4) SALR
744 (CC) (noting that the judicial certification of the Constitution was unprecedented). Its
ruling determining the constitutionality of the KwaZulu-Nata Constitution was more bold, with
the Court emphatically declaring that the text might be seen as an attempt by the province to
usurp more power than it was granted under the interim Constitution. See Certification of the
Amended Text of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996, 1997 (2) SALR 97, 162
(CC).
198 See, e.g., State v. Vermaas; State v. du Plessis, 1995 (3) SALR
292 (CC);Jeremy Sarkin, The
ConstitutionalCourt'sDecision on Legal Representation: State v. Vermaas; State v. du Plessis, 12 S.
AFR.J. HuM. RmS. 55 (1996);Jeremy Sarkin, Problems and ChallengesFacingSouth Africa's Constitutional Court: An Evaluation of its Decisions on Capital and CorporalPunishment, 113 S. AFR. LJ. 71
(1996).

TBE EECT OFCONST1LTTlONAL BORROH7NGS

Fall 1998]

tween competing demands inherent in the problem. ' 9
In the same vein, the Court later stated that Parliament
could have chosen to insist that a comprehensive amnesty

manifestly involved an inequality of sacrifice between the
victims and the perpetrators of invasions into the fundamental rights of such victims and their families.... They
could have chosen to differentiate between the wrongful

acts committed in defense of the old order and those committed in the resistance of it, or they could have chosen a
comprehensive form of amnesty which [sic] did not make

this distinction. Again they were entitled to make the latter
choice. The choice of alternatives legitimately fell wvithin
the judgement of the lawmakers. The exercise of that
choice does not, in my view, impact on its constitutional2
ity.
V.CONCLUSION
The expanded role of international and comparative law has had
a marked impact on the South African legal system. The particular
context of South Africa's Bill of Rights will remain crucial and imitative approaches that fail to account for South Africa's unique situation are unlikely to be successful. Nevertheless, international law and
comparative lessons on constitutional adjudication and interpretation
will play a key role until a truly South African constitutional jurisprudence emerges.
Constitutional decisions in South Africa and other countries suggest that the language of a bill of rights is only one among many factors guiding its interpretation. Words in a bill of rights are often
vague, and the interpretation of expressions such as "life," "liberty,"
"equality," "security," and "equal protection" by individual judges is
greatly affected by the judge's economic, political, and social values.3'
While the most important factor determining interpretation is the
composition of the adjudicating court, factors such as public opinion
also play a role. In Canada, for example, the Court has not focused
on the words of the Charter and seldom on the legislative intent of
the framers, but rather has adopted a "balancing approach."In spite of such reservations about the meaningfulness of the specific phraseology of a constitution and bill of rights, it is obviously
true that language must be an important factor in judicial interpretation. 3 For this reason, both constitutional language and the manner
19

20

0

202

AZAPO, 1996 (4) SALR at 695.
Id. at 698.

SeePEIERW. HOGG,CONSTITtIO,NALL,,wOFQ"ADA 653 (1985).

Id.at 646.
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in which various clauses have been interpreted in other domestic
constitutions and international instruments are important in the
South African context. How other courts have interpreted the rights
to life, equality, dignity, freedom, security of the person, and so on,
are important as a guide to South African courts. At the same time,
when predicting the outcome of a decision, one cannot ignore the
South African policy factors which will play their part. Thus, the context within which a matter is adjudicated, the politics of the country,
as well as such factors as judicial appointment procedures, must be
examined.
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